Recognition of a Foreign Divorce in the State of Connecticut

Recognition of a Foreign Countries Divorce in the State of Connecticut:

The Principle of Comity



The concept of securing a divorce in a foreign country, and seeking its recognition in a Connecticut court is far from novel. Connecticut Reporters are replete with cases concerning this issue. The general proposition is that divorce judgments of foreign nations may be recognized by Connecticut courts. The seminal case is Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540 (1972). The Court set forth the rule that is followed, to this day, in Connecticut, “[J]udgments of courts of foreign countries are recognized in the United States because of the comity due to the courts and the judgments of one nation from another.” Id. at 545




Comity is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as, (1) “courtesy among political entities (as nations, states, or courts or different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.” Connecticut Courts will follow the decision of a foreign country as a matter of courtesy. Nowhere does the law suggest that principles of comity require the court to respect the decision of a foreign court. In fact the Court was clear in Litvaitis, saying that “[t]he full faith and credit clause of the constitution of the United States does not apply to a divorce obtained in a foreign country.” Id.




With this in mind the Litvaitis, court fashioned four exceptions to the general rule set forth above. First, a “decree of divorce will not be recognized by comity where it was [1] obtained by a procedure which denies due process of law in the real sense of the term, or [2] was obtained by fraud, or [3] where the divorce offends public policy of the state in which recognition is sought, or [4] where the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.” Id. quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 964.




The fourth requirement, the omnipresent question of jurisdiction can be raised by either party or the Court at any time. The Litvaitis Court addressed jurisdictional issues in divorce cases directly saying that:
[o]ur courts will not recognize a divorce obtained in a foreign country if neither spouse had a domicil in that country. The rule that a domicil of at least one of the spouse in the jurisdiction granting the divorce is essential to give the court jurisdiction to grant a divorce applies to decrees of foreign nations as well as to decrees entered within the Untied States, even though a domicil is not required by the laws of the jurisdiction which grants the divorce” id. at 545; also see 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 965; Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440 (1948), State v. Cooke, 110 Conn. 348, Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689.



The United States Supreme Court has also weighed in on the requirement that domicil of one party must be found in order for a divorce decree to be valid. “The framers of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking world has questioned it.” Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)




Because domicil is a jurisdictional requirement it is critical to understand what constitutes domicil. In Williams two married defendants, residents of North Carolina, went to Nevada in order to get divorced from their respective spouses. Nevada requires six weeks to establish residency. After six weeks each defendant obtained their divorce; subsequently they were intermarried. Upon returning to North Carolina they were prosecuted for bigamous cohabitation. The North Carolina Court did not recognize the Nevada divorce because neither party was a domiciliary of Nevada. “Domicil implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance.” Id.




The Williams case was fairly straightforward in that the parties, after their divorce immediately returned to North Carolina. The Court balanced the issue granting full faith and credit against North Carolina’s rights to address internal social issues. However, what is important is that the Williams Court approved of North Carolina’s authority to deny that domicil existed in Nevada.




The Rice case cited above involved almost the same geographical issues as the Williams case. In each instance, the questionable divorce was obtained in the State of Nevada. However, in Rice the parties involved were Connecticut residents. Moreover, the facts were stronger in favor of finding domicil in Rice than they were in Williams. The defendant who obtained the divorce in Nevada rented an apartment in Reno. He stated that he intended to live there. However, he only remained in the state long enough to complete the divorce action. He then relocated to California, while keeping his apartment in Nevada.




The trial court found that the party seeking to enforce the decree was not a domiciliary of Nevada. “To constitute domicil, the residence at the place chosen for the domicil must be actual, and to the fact of residence there must be added the intention of remaining permanently; and that place is the domicil of the person in which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere temporary or special purpose, but with the present intention of making it his home, unless or until something which is uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent home.” Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612 at 617. The defendant’s intention to remain in Nevada definitely, while in Nevada is only part of the equation. “When [a party] left this State with the intention of never returning, their domicil in Connecticut was not thereby changed. The former domicil persists until a new one is acquired. Id. at 446, quoting McDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn 169 Because Rice left Nevada for a job in California and because he only remained in Nevada long enough to obtain a divorce the Connecticut Supreme Court held that he was not domiciled in Nevada and the Nevada divorce decree was invalid because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.